Most of the concepts applicable to interpreting governing documents applies to interpreting statutes.  See also Index, interpreting governing documents.

Utah Code

The Utah Code establishes some basic tenets of statutory interpretation.  It states, unless the construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the Legislature or repugnant to the context of the statute:

• The singular includes the plural, and the plural includes the singular.
• A word used in the present tense includes the future tense.
• “Include,” "includes," or "including" means that the items listed are not an exclusive list, unless the word "only" or similar language is used to expressly indicate that the list is an exclusive list.
• The use of the following terms in the Utah Code is strongly discouraged: "but not limited to" after "include," "includes," or "including."
• "May" means that an action is authorized or permissive, as opposed to "shall" which that an action is required or mandatory.
• "May not" means that an action is not authorized and is prohibited.

Utah Code  § 68-3-12.

"Writing" includes: (a) printing; (b) handwriting; and (c) information stored in an electronic or other medium if the information is retrievable in a perceivable format.  Utah Code 68-3-12.5(46).

When a statute lists more than one requirement that must be fulfilled, note the use of "and" versus "or" before the last list item, such as in the following: "You must go to work, to the store, and to the park" versus "you must go to work, to the store, or to the park."  “And” typically signifies a conjunctive list, meaning each condition in the list must be satisfied, while “or” typically signifies a disjunctive list, meaning satisfying any one condition in the list is sufficient.  

Intent of Legislature, Purpose of Statute

Utah Law requires that "each provision of, and each proceeding under, the Utah Code shall be construed with a view to effect the objects of the provision and to promote justice."  Utah Code § 68-3-2.

A central goal of courts in statutory interpretation is effectuating the intent of the Legislature.  See, e.g., L.G. v. State (In re A.T.), 2015 UT 41, ¶ 16, 353 P.3d 131 ("With any question of statutory interpretation, our primary goal is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature.").  To ascertain that intent, a court looks "first to the text of the statute within its context," beginning with the plain language of the provision at issue in a "broader effort to ascertain the intent of the Legislature disclosed by the language of the act as a whole, the act's operation, and its purpose." State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶ 10, 356 P.3d 1258.

The problem is, which legislative intent? Of one congressperson? Or lobbyist? And at which point in the legislative process? And why should the voice of one be allowed to rule the democratic will of the assembly as reflected in the words of the statute? Thus, the text of the statute itself is the preeminent source of legislative intent.

However, "where the language of the statute is clear, that language controls and cannot be overridden by a presumed statutory purpose."  VCS, Inc. v. Utah Cmty. Bank, 2012 UT 89, ¶ 23, 293 P.3d 290.  The purpose of a statute plays a role in statutory interpretation only where "the language of a statute is ambiguous."  See id. at ¶ 22, citing Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt Lake Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 2012 UT 4, ¶ 21, 270 P.3d 441.  

Legislative History

Utah courts decline to “delve into the uncertain facts of legislative history” unless a statute is ambiguous.  Hooban v. Unicity Int’l, Inc., 2012 UT 40, ¶ 17, 285 P.3d 766; Visitor Info. Ctr. Auth. v. Customer Serv. Div., Utah State Tax Comm'n, 930 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Utah 1997).

The Utah Supreme Court has made clear that “evaluation of the statutes purpose must start with its text, not the legislative history.” Hooban v. Unicity Int’l., Inc., ¶ 17.

To be “a government of laws, not of men is to be governed by what the laws say and not what the people who drafted the laws intended.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law at 375 (2012).  See also 2A Norman J. Singer & Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46:1 at 157–58 (7th ed. 2014) (“The intent of the authors of legislation is gleaned from what is said, not from what they may have intended to say.”).

Utah courts have repeatedly held that “legislative history [including statements by legislators] must yield to the clear and unmistakable language of the statute.” C.T. ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35 ¶ 13, 977 P.2d 479; Scalia & Garner, supra note 10 at 56–58.

Canons of statutory construction are interpretive aids that provide guiding principles for the court, avoiding the need to resort to legislative history like the unenacted statements of legislators. Scalia & Garner, 369–396, 426; Hooban v. Unicity Int’l, Inc., 2012 UT 40, ¶¶ 17–18, 285 P.3d 766 (noting that it is inappropriate to invoke “the views of a single legislator as to the statute's "purpose" without regard to the purpose set forth in the statutory text”).

Ambiguity

Even if some specific terms may appear ambiguous when interpreted in isolation, that is not sufficient for a finding of ambiguity.  See, e.g., State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶ 22, 356 P.3d 1258 ("A statute is ambiguous when its terms remain susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations after we have conducted a plain language analysis." (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2015 UT 25, ¶ 11, 345 P.3d 648 ("[W]e do not interpret statutory provisions in isolation.  We ... construe terms in each part or section of a statute in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.  The meaning of seemingly unclear or ambiguous provisions is often clear when read in context of the entire statute." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Internal Inconsistency. As to what constitutes ambiguity, a statute is not ambiguous merely because it is internally consistent, such as where two of its parts contradict. Where the statute is internally inconsistent between two statements and no interpretation would allow either statement to operate without nullifying the other, choosing which statement controlled would be “legislation by judicial fiat,” and therefore both are void and revising the statute is left to the legislature. So, where the language, although contradictory, is clear and plain on its face, it is therefore not ambiguous and the court will not turn to legislative history and relevant policy considerations.¹  See Rule Against Surplusage below.

Canons of Construction

Where statutory language is ambiguous or where the facts raise issues that the legislature did not foresee, courts must resort to interpretive aids. Canons of statutory construction are interpretive aids that provide guiding principles for the court, avoiding the need to resort to legislative history like the unenacted statements of legislators.  This approach provides certainty as to which principles courts will use to determine a statute’s meaning.  Such certainty is important to the citizens who must abide by the law, to the attorneys advising clients on how to follow the law, and to the legislature, allowing them to make drafting choices intelligently.  Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Making Laws Moral: A Defense of Substantive Canons of Construction, 2001 Utah L. Rev. 915, 919; Visitor Info. Ctr. Auth. v. Customer Serv. Div., Utah State Tax Comm'n, 930 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Utah 1997); Scalia & Garner, supra note 10 at 61.

Canons based on the statute’s linguistic, structural, or statutory context can be applied without first establishing ambiguity.

The court has expressly committed to apply the following canons without requiring ambiguity:

• the ordinary meaning canon,
• the punctuation rule,
• the rule against surplusage,
• the rule of consistent usage and meaningful variation, and
• the whole act rule, including its derivatives.
• The technical meaning canon also arguably falls into this category as an exception to the court’s presumption that the legislature used a term according to its ordinary meaning

Ambiguity appeared to be a prerequisite in cases where the court applied the following canons:

• noscitur a sociis (a word’s meaning is informed by the neighboring words with which it is associated),
• ejusdem generis (when a general or collective term follows a list of specific items, the general term should be limited to items of the same kind or class as the items specified),
• expressio unius (expression of one thing is the exclusion of another), and
• the last antecedent rule (qualifying words modify the words immediately preceding them and not words more remote, unless the context requires otherwise).

Canons that do not require ambiguity should generally govern over canons that do. See State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, ¶ 25, 4 P.3d 795.

When faced with an interpretive issue where multiple canons apply, courts are forced to choose between making a policy judgment, looking to legislative history, or using some other rule to choose among the applicable canons.

Textual Canons

1.  Ordinary Meaning Canon

Utah Code § 68-3-11 provides

Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or are defined by statute, are to be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition. 

Courts begin assessing interpretive questions with a presumption that “that the legislature used each word advisedly and according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.” State v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 75 ¶ 13, P.3d 1257. 

Utah courts routinely cite Black’s Law Dictionary, Webster’s (Third New International) Dictionary, and the Oxford English Dictionary and are unlikely to look favorably on arguments based on the use of one dictionary alone when others contradict the definition presented. See, e.g., State v. Berriel, 2013 UT 19, 299 P.3d 1133; Hansen v. Hansen, 2012 UT 9, 270 P.3d 531.

To discern the ordinary meaning of a word, one should begin by referring to dictionaries.  Next, in determining which of the range of senses of the word applies to the case at hand, analyze the way the word is generally used in context with its surrounding words, the way that it is used in related statutes, and the intent of the statute as evidenced by its text.

When a term is not expressly defined in the statute and "does not appear to be a technical term of art, we construe it to partake of the ordinary meaning the word would have to a reasonable person familiar with the usage and context of the language in question."  Hi-Country Prop. Rights Grp. v. Emmer, 2013 UT 33, ¶ 18, 304 P.3d 851 (unanimous opinion) (only seeking to determine the ordinary meaning of the term at issue after finding that the "term is not expressly defined in the Act, and does not appear to be a technical term of art") (footnote omitted); State v. Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955, 956 (1933) ("Under the ordinary canons of construction of statutes we are required to give the word its plain, natural, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, in the absence of any statutory or well-established technical meaning, unless it is plain from the statute that a different meaning is intended.").

Nontechnical words are generally "given the meaning which they have for laymen in ... daily usage."  O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, ¶ 32, 217 P.3d 704.  "The starting point for discerning such meaning is the dictionary.  A dictionary is useful in cataloging a range of possible meanings that a statutory term may bear."  Hi-Country at ¶ 19.  "Such a record, however, will often fail to dictate what meaning a word must bear in a particular context.  That question will often require further refinement—of selecting the best meaning among a range of options, based on other indicators of meaning evident in the context of the statute (including, particularly, the structure and language of the statutory scheme)." id.

2.  Technical Meaning Canon

Courts depart from the ordinary meaning of words when they are used in a technical sense, but the court prefers plain meaning in “absence of any statutory or well-established technical meaning.”  Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10 ¶ 13, 179 P.3 768.  See also Scalia & Garner, supra note 10 at 69 (“Interpreters should not be required to divine arcane nuances or discover hidden meanings.”); Utah Code § 68-3-11.

The more technical or specialized the area of law the statute deals with, the more likely a court is to apply a term’s technical meaning. See Fitzpatrick v. State Tax Comm’n, 386 P.2d 896 (Utah 1963).  Courts also adopt the technical meaning where the ordinary meaning produces an injustice or absurd results. State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981 (1989).

3.  Noscitur a Sociis (“it is known from its associates”)

The meaning of an unclear or ambiguous word (as in a statute or contract) should be determined by considering the words with which it is associated in the context.

Where the legislature creates a list in a statute, noscitur a sociis can be used to argue the proper scope of the items in that list. That is, that the proper scope of an entry in a list is determined by reference to a feature shared by the other items in that list.  Identify the common feature—for example, noxiousness or formality—that allows the court to extrapolate the proper scope of a term.

A zoning ordinance prohibited any “barn, stable, coop, pen, or corral.” “A dog run may be considered literally a “pen” in the sense that it is an enclosure,” but a dog run does not “have the noxious nature analogous to the other structures set forth in the ordinance.” Padjen v. Shipley, 553 P.2d 938 (Utah 1976).

Did government immunity apply when school officials gave permission to use blank bullets in a real gun for a musical production. Under the licensing exemption, the state retained immunity from suit based on the “issuance . . . of a permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization.” The state argued that the school official’s action was an approval or authorization covered under this exemption. The words’ “placement in a list of terms that include “permit,” license,” “certificate,” and “order”” have a common feature from which we may extrapolate meaning.” The common feature was “formal and official action.” The court concluded that the licensing exemption did not apply because the school officials’ actions merely amounted to “a routine operational approval” and not a formal authorization. Thayer v. Washington County School Dist., 2012 UT 31, 285 P.3d 1142.  Ideally, this common element should have a link to the apparent purpose of the statute, as well.

4.  Ejusdem Generis ("of the same kind or class")

When a general or collective term, a “catch-all,” follows a list of specific items, the general term should be limited to items of the same kind or class as the items specified.  The canon applies to catchall terms as opposed to individual list entries (as in Noscitur a Sociis).

Is a prosecutor a “sheriff, constable, peace officer, state road officer, or any other person charged with the duty of enforcement of the criminal laws of this state”? Standing alone, prosecutors would certainly be included among “persons charged with the duty of enforcement of the criminal laws of the state,” but the court identified common features among the other entries in the list: each was a badge-wearing officer, routinely in immediate contact with the public, charged with seeking out criminal suspects, with the power to make arrests. The court concluded that “prosecuting attorneys . . . are officers of such a significantly different character that they are not within the class for whom the protections of this statute was intended.” Thus, the court not only identified a common feature, but also aligned this feature with the apparent intent of the statute. Heathman v. Giles, 374 P.2d 839 (Utah 1962).

Is the Democratic Party a “labor union, labor organization or any other type of association”? The other types of associations embraced by the statute must be “adjective and akin to, and inclusively complementary to the phrases “labor union” and “labor organization.”” The common feature the court recognized was that of “labor” and that organized labor was significantly different from political organizations. Anderson v. Utah Cnty., 368 P.2d 912 (Utah 1962).

Is a typewriter “a motor vehicle, trailer, appliance, equipment, tool or other valuable thing”? The defendant argued that “motor vehicle” and “trailer” should limit the statute to only heavy equipment. The court noted that if the other terms in the list could be regarded as that of the same general character, the argument would be more persuasive, but because the terms “appliance,” “equipment,” and “tool” are not limited to the character of motor vehicles and trailers, the argument under ejusdem generis failed. The legislature’s use of general terms along with the inclusion of motor vehicles and trailers only demonstrated that the legislature intended to make the category of items covered expansive. State v. Knepper, 418 P.2d 780 (Utah 1966).

5.  Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius ("expression of one thing is the exclusion of another")

This canon works to exclude items not included in the list.  “It is often said that it should be assumed that all of the words used in a statute were used advisedly and were intended to be given meaning and effect. For the same reasons, the omissions should likewise be taken note of and given effect.” Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 514 P.2d 217, 219 (Utah 1973).  See also In re Gestational Agreement, 2019 UT 40, ¶ 20, 449 P.3d 69 (assuming the term "mother" in the pertinent statute was used advisedly and to the exclusion of words like "father" or "parent").

However, this principle only applies where the item the legislature expressed are members of an associated group or series, justifying the inference that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice and not inadvertence.  State v. Evans, 500 P. 3d 811 ¶ 62 - Utah: Supreme Court 2021; Cullum v. Farmers Ins. Exch. 857 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1993); Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1025 (Utah 1996). See also Field v. Boyer, 952 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1998 (holding that actionable breaches of legal duty did not include intentional torts because they are categorically different and the legislature omitted any references to intentional torts).  "As the Supreme Court has made clear, expressio unius 'does not apply unless it is fair to suppose that [the legislature] considered the unnamed possibility and meant to say no to it.'"  Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 381, 133 S.Ct. 1166, 185 L.Ed.2d 242 (2013).

Expressio unius can be used as a foil to noscitur a sociis or ejusdem generis.

Identify the creation of a category, either by a term or in a list, and that the association between that category and the omitted item is close enough to support the inference that the omission was intentional. The inference is strongest when the legislature goes to the effort of creating a list.  See State v. MacNeil, 2012 UT App 263 ¶ 8, 286 P. 3d 1278, cert. denied State v. MacNeill, 298 P.3d 69 (2013); Anderson v. Bell, 201 UT 47 ¶ 18, 234 P. 3d 1147.

6.  Last Antecedent Rule (or Doctrine of the Last Preceding Antecedent)

Limiting language following a list applies only to the final item in the list—the “last antecedent.”  And qualifying words modify the words immediately preceding them and not words more remote, unless the context or spirit of the entire writing requires otherwise.

In the phrase, “to motor vehicles when especially constructed for towing, wrecking, maintenance, or repair purposes, and not otherwise used in transporting goods and merchandise for compensation; or when constructed as armored cars and used for the safe conveyance or delivery of money or other valuables, or when used as hearses, ambulances, or licensed taxicabs, operating within a fifteen mile radius of the limits of any city or town,” the fifteen mile radius provision only applied to hearses, ambulances, or licensed taxicabs. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 626 P.2d 450 (Utah 1981).

On the other hand, one case interpreted the last antecedent rule as allowing modifiers to apply to “preceding terms of the same character, if the natural and sensible meaning of the wording so requires.” Is a city included in the phrase “no fees shall be charged the state, or any county or subdivision thereof, or any public officer acting therefor.” A city is a subdivision of the state not a county. The court cites noscitur a sociis to support its conclusion that the limiting language “subdivision” could properly be applied to both counties and states, and noted its inability to see why the legislature would choose to exempt subdivisions of counties, but not subdivisions of the state.  Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake Cnty., 568 P.2d 738 (Utah 1977).

The default rule is that the modifier applies only to the last entry in that list—the last antecedent.  However, the legislature can override this default rule by setting the modifier off from the list with a comma.  This indicates that the legislature intends for the modifier to apply to the entire list.

For instance, the placement of a comma in the following phrase significantly changes its meaning.  In the phrase Texas courts, New Mexico courts, and New York courts in the federal system, the words in the federal system might be held to modify only New York courts and not Texas courts or New Mexico courts.  When the comma placement is changed like this: Texas courts, New Mexico courts and New York courts, in the federal system, the words in the federal system modify New York courts, Texas courts and New Mexico courts. 

Distinct from the rule of the last antecedent is a principle enunciated in a federal law case, "When several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as the last, the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be read as applicable to all."  Port Rico Railway, Light & Power Co. v. Mor, 253 U.S. 345, 348 (1920).  In another case, a provision of the federal criminal code mandates restitution for the full amount of the victim's losses, which are defined to include five specific types of loss (e.g., medical costs, lost income) and "any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the offense."  The Court held that the phrase "as a proximate result of the offense" modified each of the five separately listed types of losses.  Paroline v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 1710, 1722, 572 U.S. 434 (2014).

7.  Punctuation & Grammar Rule

This canon reflects the commonsense assumption that the legislature knows and adheres to the basic rules of punctuation and grammar.  Although courts need not always consider punctuation to discern legislative intent, courts should not arbitrarily ignore punctuation, but should give it due consideration and effect where it may be used as an aid to ascertain the legislature's purpose.”  State v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, 44 P.3d 680.

A court will not adopt interpretations that are contrary to the apparent purpose of a statute or that greatly alter the scope of statutes’ applicability on the basis of punctuation. See Union Refrigeration Transit Co. v. Lynch, 55 P. 639 (Utah 1898) & Richardson v. Treasure Hill Mining Co., 65 P. 74 (Utah 1901), respectively.  However, while “punctuation may not be permitted to affect or to defeat the legislative intention or to make that obscure which otherwise would be clear . . . [p]unctuation may, however, be resorted to as an aid in ascertaining the legislative intent, and where such is the case courts may not, and do not, arbitrarily ignore punctuation, but will give it due consideration and effect."  Bd. of Educ. v. Hanchett, 167 P. 686 (Utah 1917).

The Whole Act Rule and its Derivative Canons

1.  The Whole Act Rule

The court does not “view individual words and subsections in isolation; instead, our statutory interpretation requires that each part or section be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.”  Summit Operating, LLC v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2012 UT 91 ¶ 11, 293 P.3d 369.  This rule not only allows the court to look to other provisions of the same statute, but also to related statutes.  Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19 ¶ 17–18, 5 P.3d 616.

The substantive terms canon, also referred to as the omitted-case canon, does not allow adding substantive terms to a statute to arrive at an interpretation.  If a statute doesn't explicitly address a specific situation, it should not be assumed to implicitly address it.  The text of the statute is the limit of its coverage.  "'We will not infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there. Rather the interpretation must be based on the language used, and we have no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not expressed.'  Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 2001 UT 29, ¶ 12, 24 P.3d 928; see also Trittipo v. O'Brien, 204 Ill.App.3d 662, 149 Ill.Dec. 505, 561 N.E.2d 1201, 1203 (1990) ("The statute should be interpreted on the basis of what was written, and courts should not search for any subtle or not readily apparent intention of the legislature."). In short, where the legislature has not indicated an intention to enact an unprecedented legal requirement, we will not alter the statutory terms to surmise one."  Bryner v. Cardon Outreach, LLC, 428 P. 3d 1096 - Utah: Supreme Court 2018.

On the other hand, "when a statute is silent regarding particular circumstances and we determine that such a gap was not the intent of the legislature, 'we must determine the best rule of law to ensure that the statute is applied uniformly.'  We 'analyze the act in its entirety and harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose.'"  Cox v. Laycock, 345 P. 3d 689 - Utah: Supreme Court 2015.  In Cox, the court looked at whether a political party could be foreclosed from nominating its candidate in advance of the general election when the primary had been annulled through no fault of the party.  The Utah Code does not give procedures to fill a candidate vacancy when a primary election is annulled.  The court concluded that it could not have been the intent of the legislature to leave the candidacy vacant, and therefore looked to the most analogous provisions in the election code to ascertain how the legislature intended the current situation to be resolved.  The court concluded that an analogous section of the code presented the closest analogy to the situation in the case and ordered that the procedures of that section be used.  Cox at ¶ 42 (citing Miss. Methodist Hosp. & Rehab. Ctr. v. Miss. Div. of Medicaid, 21 So.3d 600, 607 (Miss.2009) ("[I]f a statute ... is silent on a specific issue[,].... the ultimate goal of this Court is to discern the legislative intent." (citation omitted)); Ogborne v. Mercer Cemetery Corp., 197 N.J. 448, 963 A.2d 828, 834 (2009) ("In light of the Act's silence on the issue, we look to the underlying legislative intent."); Clarkston v. Bridge, 273 Or. 68, 539 P.2d 1094, 1099 (1975) ("When the legislature has not spoken on a particular issue which arises under a statute, it is our duty to determine their probable intent.")

2.  Presumption Against Absurd Results

This canon reflects the commonsense proposition that the court disfavors interpretations that produce results “so absurd that the legislative body which authored the legislation could not have intended it.”  Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50 ¶ 26, 267 P. 3d 863.  The presumption against absurdity is intended to operate under limited circumstances—the doctrine applies only where the legislature could not possibly have intended the result. Merely pointing out that the policy is unwise or counterintuitive is insufficient.  Id.

3.  Rule Against Surplusage

Statutes should be construed so that no part or provision will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another.

If no interpretation of two contradicting parts would allow either part to operate without nullifying the other, the statute may be inoperable and void.  The “court will not construe a statute in such a way as to render certain viable parts meaningless and void.” Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 876 (Utah 1995).  And where the statute is internally inconsistent between two sections and no interpretation would allow either section to operate without nullifying the other, choosing which statement controlled would be “legislation by judicial fiat,” and therefore both are void and revising the statute is left to the legislature.¹  “The error made by the Legislature ... is so basic that the courts cannot, by a rule of construction, rectify the mistake.”  American Elec. Power Serv. Corp. v. State, 619 P.2d 314, 315 (Utah 1980).

In the Context of the Whole.  The Utah Supreme Court has said, "But we do not interpret the 'plain meaning' of a statutory term in isolation.  Under our rules of statutory construction, we must give effect to every provision of a statute and avoid an interpretation that will render portions of a statute inoperative.  To achieve this goal, we construe the provision at issue with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole."  Warne v. Warne, 2012 UT 13, ¶¶ 35, 36, 275 P.3d 238  (internal quotation marks omitted).  See also, Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577 at 585 (1998) (a statute is to "be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another.").

All Parts Given Meaning.

Statutory enactments are to be construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful.  Likewise, we are compelled to give the statutory language meaning and to assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly . . . unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable. We will avoid an interpretation which renders portions of, or words in, a statute superfluous or inoperative.

Labelle v. McKay Dee Hosp. Ctr., 2004 UT 15, ¶ 16, 89 P.3d 113.

4.  Presumption of Consistent Usage and Meaningful Variation

The court presumes that the legislature uses each word in a statute advisedly.  Li v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Utah, 2006 UT 80 ¶ 21,150 P. 3d 471.  When the legislature repeatedly uses the same word, the court presumes that legislature intended it to be interpreted consistently. Likewise, when the legislature chooses not to use the same word, the court presumes that it meant that word to have a different meaning.

When the court considered whether a conviction included sentencing, although a previous case held that conviction is a technical term and that sentencing was a part of conviction, the court noted that in this case the legislature used “sentence” as well as “conviction” in the same statute. Therefore, the court concluded, the legislature clearly intended the two words to carry different meanings.  State v. Ewell, 883 P.2d 1360, 1363 (UT Ct. Apps. 1993).

The more often that the legislature uses a term consistently, the stronger the presumption of consistent usage becomes. This is especially true when the term is “a well-established term of art.” See Li v. Enterprise at ¶ 21.  Likewise, meaningful variation applies when the legislature has a term with a well-established meaning at its disposal, but chooses to use a different word instead.

Independent Meaning.  The presumption of independent meaning (and similarly, the presumption against surplusage) "presumes that each provision of a statute has meaning independent of all others.  It expresses, in other words, a reluctance to attribute to the legislature the intent to adopt a nullity—to enact a provision that says nothing not already stated elsewhere."  Lancer Ins v. Lake Shore Motor, 2017 UT 8 at ¶ 13.  However, "legislation may include surplus terms aimed at underscoring an important point.  With that in mind, courts may view a few isolated words as simply reiterating what is stated elsewhere—as a reinforcement in an abundance of caution."  Id. at ¶ 14.

Interpreting a statute so as to allow possible exceptions to swallow a particular requirement is an outcome that runs afoul of the settled canon of preserving independent meaning for all statutory provisions.  See VCS, Inc. v. Utah Cmty. Bank, 2012 UT 89, ¶ 18, 293 P.3d 290.

5.  Specific Language Governs over General Language

When two statutes apply to the same set of circumstances, courts will choose to apply the provision more specific to that set of circumstances.  The presumption is that the legislature would not have passed the more specific provision if it intended for the general provision to govern.

The court found the Utah Protection of Public Employees Act ("Whistleblower Act") governs over the more generally applicable Governmental Immunity Act and that finding otherwise would “nullify a very specific statutory provision at the expense of preserving a much more general one.”  Hall v. Utah State Dept. of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, 24 P. 3d 958.

When two statutory provisions seem to apply to a set of circumstances, the court will apply the provision that applies with greater specificity.  As one court put it, “a provision treating a matter specifically prevails over an incidental reference made thereto in a provision treating another issue, not because one provision has more force than another, but because the legislative mind is presumed to have stated its intent when it focused on that particular issue.” Madsen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1985) (citing 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 255).  Thus, the statute that governs is the statute that most precisely describes the circumstances of the case— often, the more narrow category.²  In some cases, reference to other statutes may show that the legislature intended one provision to apply over another. See Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19 ¶¶ 19–20, 5 P.3d 616.

Legislative Process Canons

The legislative process canons, while more distanced from the text of a statute, are still more objective than the unenacted statements of individual legislators.

1.  Acquiescence Rule

Where a court or agency interprets a statute and the legislature declines to alter the statute, the legislature’s silence can sometimes be interpreted as adopting that interpretation.

2.  Reenactment Rule

The reenactment rule is an extension of the acquiescence rule because reenactment is a clear indication that the legislature had the opportunity to consider how courts and agencies have interpreted the statute and declined to alter those interpretations. But even where the statute contains changes, Utah courts hesitate to diminish rights solely by implication.

3.  Time Spectrum Canon

Faced with a choice between two statutes that apply to the same set of circumstances, courts favor applying the more recently enacted statute because it represents the most recent expression of legislative intent with regard to that set of circumstances.

Where two statutes would seem to apply to a set of circumstances, the court will prioritize giving effect to the later-enacted statute and then attempt to reconcile the other statute.  Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, at 1319 (Utah 1983).  If the statutes are irreconcilable, the court may interpret it as a repeal by implication.  However, while a few cases show some success in expanding rights or clarifying provisions under older statutes, courts will disfavor use of this canon to abrogate another statute in light of the strong presumption against repeals by implication (discussed next).

4.  Presumption Against Repeals by Implication

Just as the rule against surplusage disfavors interpretations that would tend to ignore statutory text, the presumption against repeals by implication disfavors interpretations that would repeal entire statutory provisions.  Thus, the court will not recognize a repeal by implication “unless the terms of the later enacted law are irreconcilable with the former.”  State v. Judd, 493 P.2d 604, 606 (Utah 1972).  This presumption is so strong that no Utah appellate court has ruled in favor of a repeal by implication.

A later change or enactment is not given more weight than earlier provisions.  See e.g., Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d at  586 (stating, "We assume 'that whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, wherefore it is held that in the absence of any express repeal or amendment therein, the new provision was enacted in accord with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes, and they all should be construed together.'").

In order to successfully establish a repeal by implication, it should be established that the new statute is completely irreconcilable with the old statute. This rule may also act as a limitation on the time spectrum canon where reconciling the statutes requires abrogating statutory language.

Substantive Canons

The substantive canons provide interpretive rules based on principles of justice. Regarding linguistic canons versus substantive canons, rather than providing tools that guide statutory construction “in accordance with common, ordinary usage and understanding of language,” substantive canons “advance values or principles exogenous to the goal of identifying legislative intent.” Marion Energy v. KFJ Ranch Partnership, 2011 UT 50, 267 P.3d 863.

1.  Federalism Canons

The federalism canons seek to maintain the balance of power between the state and federal governments. Faced with ambiguity, the court will choose the interpretation that reconciles the statutes and will find preemption only as a last resort.

2.  Constitutional Avoidance

It is a fundamental rule of constitutional law that courts should avoid deciding constitutional issues if a case can be decided on other grounds. “As a corollary of that principle, courts construe statutes, if possible, to avoid the risk of running afoul of constitutional prohibitions.” State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 82–83 (Utah 1982). The presumption is that the legislature did not intend to violate the constitution. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 10 at 248–49. If one of the proposed interpretations is unconstitutional, the court will adopt an alternative interpretation in order to preserve the statute’s constitutionality.

3.  Anti-derogation Rule

Under the anti-derogation rule courts strictly construe statutes that depart from common law principles to limit their impact on the common law. But under Utah Law, “the rule of the common law that a statute in derogation of the common law is to be strictly construed does not apply to the Utah Code.” Utah rejects the anti-derogation rule and will interpret statutes liberally where the statute expands or creates rights that the common law did not provide. In order to conclude that a statute has replaced the common law entirely, a court will require either field preemption or conflict preemption such that the two cannot be reconciled.

4.  Liberal Construction of Remedial Statutes

Where a statute is designed with a remedial purpose in mind, courts construe the statute liberally to advance the remedy. Remedial statutes are those that “correct defects, mistakes and omissions in the civil institutions and the administration of the state,” do not impose criminal or other harsh penalties, and are often procedural rather than substantive.

In order to successfully argue that a statute is remedial and should therefore be liberally construed, practitioners should begin, as the court did in Mellen v. Vondor-Horst Bro, 140 P. 130 (Utah 1914), by comparing the remedy available before and after the statute was passed.428 If the new or expanded statutory remedy “correct defects, mistakes and omissions in the civil institutions and the administration of the state,” a court is likely to read the statute expansively to advance the remedy.429 In cases where the statute does not create new rights, but expands an already existing remedy, the court may even apply the statute retroactively. See Marshall v. Indus. Comm’n of the State of Utah, 704 P.2d 581 (Utah 1985). (holding “statutes which operate in furtherance of a remedy already existing and which neither create new rights nor destroy existing rights . . .are applied retrospectively to accrued or pending actions to further the legislature's remedial purpose unless a contrary legislative intent is manifested.”).

5.  Rules Based on Statutory Subject Matter

Some interpretive rules apply based on the subject matter of the statute. The most familiar of these is the rule of lenity, which applies to criminal statutes and requires that ambiguities be resolved in the defendant’s favor. It does not generally apply in Utah, however. Tax imposition statutes are interpreted liberally in favor of the taxpayer, but deductions and credits are interpreted strictly against the taxpayer.

In sum, when interpreting a statute, one should begin with the text of the statute and canons that can be employed without leaving the text and then proceed outward to extrinsic guides, starting with the whole act rule, then legislative process canons, and then the substantive canons. Legislative history should only be used as a last resort.

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Endnote 1.  Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P. 2d 872 - Utah: Supreme Court 1995, illustrates the interpretation of an internally inconsistent statute: 

"At issue in the present case is the meaning of section 10-2-102.8(2), which provides:

If it is determined that the proposal for municipal incorporation is not feasible, that the incorporation proposed would be substantially detrimental to the structure of local government in the county or be otherwise contrary to the public interest, or that withdrawal of support from a majority of the petitioners for incorporation is presented in writing, the board of county commissioners shall issue a written order refusing to hold an election. The order shall be supported in writing with the reasons for the board of county commissioners' action. If such an order is issued, the incorporation proceedings are terminated.... Notwithstanding the provisions of  Sections 10-2-102.2, 10-2-102.4, 10-2-102.6, and 10-2-102.8, the board of county commissioners must proceed with the election unless a majority of the petitioners withdraw their signatures in writing.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-102.8(2) (1992) (emphasis added).

“Clearly, the first and last sentences of section 10-2-102.8(2) are patently inconsistent. At first blush, it may appear that the last sentence controls because it begins with the word "notwithstanding"; however, such an interpretation would strip the first sentence of all effect and meaning.”
Both parties urge this court to turn to legislative history to resolve this conflict. However, as previously noted, this court will resort to legislative history only where the language is ambiguous. See World Peace, 879 P.2d at 259; Schurtz, 814 P.2d at 1112; Brinkerhoff, 779 P.2d at 686. In the present case, the language, although contradictory, is clear and plain on its face. The first sentence of section 10-2-102.8(2) mandates that the Board terminate election proceedings on the happening of any one of four specific events, whereas the second sentence mandates that an election be held unless a majority of the original petition signers withdraw their signatures. To choose which statement controls over the whole would amount to legislation by judicial fiat. "The error made by the Legislature ... is so basic that the courts cannot, by a rule of construction, rectify the mistake." American Elec. Power Serv. Corp. v. State, 619 P.2d 314, 315 (Utah 1980). Accordingly, the power to remedy this inconsistency lies within the province of our legislature. . . . the underlying statute is so flawed that it is entirely inoperable.”
Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P. 2d 872 - Utah: Supreme Court 1995.

Endnote 2.  This principle might have found application in Dimmitt v. City Court of Salt Lake City, 444 P.2d 461 (Utah 1968) where a juvenile challenged a traffic court’s jurisdiction because the Juvenile Court Act granted exclusive jurisdiction to the juvenile court.  Although the juvenile courts deals with a specific class of offender, the traffic code deals with a more specific class of offenses. “Committing a traffic violation” more precisely describes the defendant’s conduct, when compared to “committing a crime as a juvenile."